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ABSTRACT 
The business of mineral extraction fundamentally entails 
environmental costs and social challenges.  However, the harm 
caused by operations is disproportionately present in the 
developing (as opposed to the developed) country context. Using an 
interdisciplinary approach, this paper seeks to uncover why the 
presence of extractive industries in developing countries inhibits 
development by delving into the role of law in the governance of 
transnational corporations.  The transnational order is evolving 
toward an era of sector-specific, non-hierarchical collective global 
governance mechanisms such as the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI).  This paper responds to social science 
research which deemed the EITI ineffective at affecting key 
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governance indicators.  It counters this finding by demonstrating 
that effectiveness is an insufficient metric for assessing regulatory 
quality in this context and then proffers an alternative metric.  
Instead, mechanisms like the EITI are better assessed by the two-
prong test developed herein: (1) the role it plays in catalyzing 
consensus and changing institutional behaviors and (2) the 
mechanism’s institutional flexibility.  This paper explores how a 
departure from the concepts enshrined in linear liability models will 
be required to achieve the EITI’s sustainable development goals.  
The cornerstone contribution of this paper is its innovative 
introduction of the notion of “collaborative accountability” in the 
place of more traditional linear responsibility concepts. It sets out 
the argument that organizations like the EITI that possess the 
concepts of collaborative accountability have a robust potential to 
positively impact the governance of transnational corporations. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Achieving Sustainable Development through Collective 
Governance 
Sustainable development has been defined as human progress 
that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”1  It is a 
developmental concept recognizing the existence of the three 
intertwined dimensions to progress: social, economic, and 
environmental.  Sustainable development aims to balance these 
indivisible objectives.  In 2015, the United Nations sought to more 
specifically delineate sustainable development targets in its 
Sustainable Development Goals.2  Achieving these goals requires 
national and subnational political reforms, access to knowledge and 
resources, and the rethinking of existing international governance 
frameworks.3  Sustainable development recognizes that while 
nature imposes certain thresholds, growth is critical to 
sustainability, especially within the context of developing nations.  
However, it has become increasingly clear that this growth can no 
longer be based on the overexploitation of natural resources, but 
must be managed in a way that enhances the societies in which such 
resources are produced.  We have entered into a new era in the 
history of development.  It is an era of managing natural resources, 
not simply exhausting them; an era of linking economic growth and 
environmental protection in strategies for sustainable 
development.4 
Achieving sustainable development will require an 
unprecedented global effort, only possible under a shared global 
framework consisting of both authority and accountability 
mechanisms.5  Redrafting components of the existing framework 
 
 1 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future: 
From One Earth to One World, (Mar. 20, 1987), http://www.un-documents.net/our-
common-future.pdf [https://perma.cc/CLQ9-RQS9]. 
 2 G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, at 1 (Sept. 25, 2015). 
 3 World Comm’n on Env’t & Dev., supra note 1, at 29. 
 4 Id. at 30. 
 5 Johan Rockstrӧm & Jeffrey D. Sachs with Marcus C. Ӧhman & Guido 
Schmidt-Traub, Sustainable Development and Planetary Boundaries, SUSTAINABLE DEV. 
SOLUTIONS NETWORK: A GLOBAL INITIATIVE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS, at 21 (May 
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requires involvement from a diverse set of stakeholders that must 
also include the private sector.6  Private sector involvement will 
require transnational oversight that is broader than even the best 
laid corporate social responsibility (CSR) efforts.7  This politically 
enlarged concept of corporate accountability8 extends beyond the 
boardroom, taking the form of a collective effort by government, 
civil society, and industry.9  While it is recognized herein that 
transnational oversight of this magnitude requires an international 
collective governance mechanism, I do so with pause as I by no 
means advocate moving toward a “world government.”  
Extrapolating existing command and control concepts imbedded 
within domestic regimes and implementing them in toto at the 
international level would result in an overly bureaucratic system 
devoid of true democracy.  Such a system would be even more 
“accommodating to power, more hospitable to hegemonic ambition, 
and more reinforcing of the roles of states and governments rather 
than the rights of people.”10  Despite these concerns, it is the nature 
of global problems that they must be solved with global solutions.11  
Hence, collective governance mechanisms at the international level 
will be required in order to achieve sustainable development. 
One essential aspect of these collective mechanisms is the 
promotion of regulatory quality at the national and subnational 
level.12  Regulatory quality “[r]eflects perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development.”13  
 
2013), http://www.post2015hlp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Rockstroem-
Sachs-Oehman-Schmidt-Traub_Sustainable-Development-and-Planetary-
Boundaries.pdf [https://perma.cc/PBE9-HX6V]. 
 6 See Florian Wettstein, Corporate Responsibility in the Collective Age: Toward a 
Conception of Collaborative Responsibility, 117 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 155, 173 (2012) 
(equating corporate responsibility with political responsibility). 
 7 Nathan Andrews, A Swiss-Army Knife? A Critical Assessment of the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative in Ghana (EITI), 121 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 59, 68 (2016). 
 8 Wettstein, supra note 6, at 173. 
 9 Andrews, supra note 7, at 68. 
 10 MARK BEVIR, GOVERNANCE: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 107 (2012). 
 11 Wettstein, supra note 6, at 157. 
 12 See BEVIR, supra note 10, at 107 (stating that although there are a number of 
other developmental objectives, for the purpose of limiting the scope of this piece, 
the focus herein is exclusively on regulatory quality). 
 13 See Benjamin K. Sovacool, Gӧtz Walter, Thijs Van de Graaf & Nathan 
Andrews, Energy Governance, Transnational Rules, and the Resource Curse: Exploring 
the Effectiveness of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), 83 WORLD 
DEV. 179, 183 (2016) (explaining the weakness of the EITI Compliance Status, which 
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There are two sides to the coin of regulatory quality: the input and 
the output. In other words: the decision-making process 
surrounding the creation and implementation of regulation, as well 
as, the accountability mechanism enforcing that regulation.  
Therefore, collective governance models simultaneously seek to 
promote democratic participation in this decision-making process 
with the aim that this participatory process will lead to greater 
regulatory quality at the subnational and national levels, and thus 
enhance corporate accountability.  However, based on a review of 
social science literature, it is apparent that there exists a breakdown 
in corporate accountability.  As such, the analysis herein will seek to 
identify the source of that breakdown and advocate an evolutionary 
iteration to the accountability component of existing collective 
global governance mechanisms at the international level.14 
This work will explore how rethinking a particular aspect—the 
accountability mechanism—of collective global governance 
frameworks will enhance sustainable development progress by 
begetting improved regulatory quality at the national and 
subnational levels.  The remainder of this chapter discusses the 
concepts of globalization, its role in cultivating structural harm, and 
the research methodology employed herein, which seeks to 
contextualize and frame the larger discussion.  Chapter 2, breaks 
down the definitional elements of governance honing in on its 
regulatory aspects, followed by a walkthrough of the regulatory 
transition from external supervision to self-regulation as catalyzed 
by globalization.  The subsequent segment delves deeper into these 
self-regulation methods of governance which began with CSR but 
have evolved into corporate participation in public-private 
partnerships (PPPs).  These PPPs, one type of collective governance 
mechanism, are characterized by two concrete elements: 
transparency and stakeholder engagement.  The notion is that these 
elements—along with the more nuanced organizational ability to 
adaptively problem-solve—have the capability of begetting 
corporate accountability, but an examination of the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (‘EITI’) in Chapter 3 
demonstrates that a breakdown in accountability occurs because the 
current framework is reliant upon the ill-fitting concept of linear 
liability.  Chapter 4 proffers a departure from the inclusion of linear 
 
is likely caused by: a limited mandate, voluntary nature, stakeholder resistance, and 
dependence on strong civil society). 
 14 BEVIR, supra note 10, at 107. 
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liability in the framework and advocates a move toward a notion of 
collaborative accountability. 
1.2. Globalization 
Globalization is becoming increasingly accepted as an economic, 
political, and societal reality.  Despite this broad conceptual 
recognition, globalization lacks a hard-and-fast definition.  
Generally speaking, the term globalization refers to entrenched and 
enduring patterns of global interconnectedness.  The transactions 
associated with this interconnectedness continue to grow in 
magnitude and intensity, enmeshing societies in worldwide systems 
and networks.15  This global interconnectedness is swiftly changing 
the nature of harm, which calls for a shift in the nature of 
governance.16  In the midst of this global transition, it is becoming 
increasingly apparent that existing global governance mechanisms 
are no longer equipped to face current global challenges.17  The 
world is transitioning toward an era requiring collective and 
collaborative responses to global challenges arising from and 
compounded by the ever-increasing interconnections between 
people and communities across the globe.18  Naturally, such a 
tectonic societal and political shift will have a momentous impact on 
the legal responsibility of businesses if we intend to achieve 
sustainable development.19 
This interconnectedness of globalization has been the fertile soil 
for the incredible growth associated with transnational 
corporations.  As such, another hallmark of globalization is the 
rampant blurring of the lines between private enterprise and public 
interest.20  Due to the relatively recent and striking amassment in 
size, income, and technological capacity of transnational 
corporations rivaling that of many nations, it has become 
increasingly difficult to regulate and monitor corporate activities 
and compliance.  Even the most powerful and developed nations 
face surmounting difficulties in controlling the activities of 
 
 15 Wettstein, supra note 6, at 156. 
 16 Id. at 181. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Sovacool et al., supra note 13, at 187. 
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businesses.21  The unfortunate reality is that governments are 
generally unwilling to regulate transnational companies even when 
legal regulation is plausible.  This is particularly the case when such 
entities operate outside of their jurisdiction.22  This phenomenon 
creates an accountability gap which leaves transnational companies 
under-regulated at best and the populations residing where they 
operate without recourse in the event of damage. 
A transnational system is multi-actor by definition.  States are 
embedded in a broader and deeper transnational arena.  Borders are 
“transcended” rather than crossed, relations become increasingly 
“supraterriorial” as distance, and borders and geographic space 
itself lose economic and political significance.  It is a system in the 
throes of evolution where uncertainty about structures, 
relationships, norms and institutions abounds.23  Increasingly, 
private actors operate in authoritative positions and fulfill 
governing functions, which were previously seen as the exclusive 
domain of governments.24  This combination of fragmentation and 
shift in public authority to private actors can lead to structural harm, 
most notably in the developing country context. 
1.3. Structural Harm 
Structural harm is harm caused to a governance system.  It is 
distinct from the concept of “social violence,” where the governance 
structure and institutions cause individual inequity.25  Structural 
harm is also distinct from intentional wrongful acts of an individual 
agent or the willfully repressive policies of a state, in that it lacks the 
intent to do harm.26  Rather, this type of harm is the inability of the 
 
 21 PENELOPE SIMONS & AUDREY MACKLIN, THE GOVERNANCE GAP: EXTRACTIVE 
INDUSTRIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE HOME STATE ADVANTAGE 7 (2014). 
 22 See Stephen J. Kobrin, Private Political Authority and Public Responsibility: 
Transnational Politics, Transnational Firms, and Human Rights, 19 BUS. ETHICS Q. 349, 
351 (2009) (explaining that transnational corporations should be held liable for 
human rights violations, but liability is often complicated by the discontinuity 
between the political structures of the corporations). 
 23 Id. at 359-60. 
 24 Wettstein, supra note 6, at 162. 
 25 See THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE OF POVERTY 47 (David 
Brady & Linda M. Burton eds. 2016) (discussing the distinction between structural 
and social violence). 
 26 See Iris Marion Young, Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection 
Model, 23 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 102, 114 (2006) (clarifying the claims about global 
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institution to develop itself in a manner sufficient to govern 
effectively.  Structural harm is the systemic destabilization of 
governance and institutional structures at the national or subnational 
level, and results in the deterioration and breakdown of mechanisms 
that drive the creation of stable governance institutions and social 
structures within a localized society. 
Providing effective regulatory oversight of transnational 
corporations is difficult due in large part to the nature of modern 
corporate entities.  Transnational corporations are challenging the 
traditional concepts of both the law of corporations and 
international law, in that legal concepts fashioned to serve a society 
in which the role of business was limited and local have become 
archaic in a world where business is conducted worldwide by giant 
corporate groups comprised of affiliated companies organized in 
dozens of countries.27  In today’s globalized world, corporate actors 
have the potential to cause and contribute to structural harm in the 
societies where they operate simply by going about routine 
activities—even without the intent to cause harm in a conventional 
sense. 28 
The ability for a corporate actor to contribute to (distinct from 
cause) structural harm is particularly relevant in contexts where 
institutional governance structures are weak, or where the rule of 
law is lacking.29  Developing nations face greater challenges than 
developed nations in providing effective regulatory oversight of 
transnational corporations.30  This is due in large part to existing 
structural and institutional inadequacies.31  Often, developing nations 
lack the institutional structure in the form of political will, technical 
capacity, as well as physical infrastructure, to provide effective 
regulatory oversight of transnational corporations.32  One of the 
overarching structural reasons for the breakdown of governance 
institutions in developing nations is that the capacity of many 
developing governments to regulate foreign investment “has been 
undermined by years of economic intervention by international 
financial institutions and is deeply embedded in the structure of the 
 
justice and injustice which are popular in our world and theorizing about the 
responsibility of moral agents). 
 27 Kobrin, supra note 22, at 358. 
 28 Wettstein, supra note 6, at 157. 
 29 Id. 
 30 SIMONS & MACKLIN, supra note 21, at 7–8. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
848 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 40:4 
international system” through trade and investment treaties.33  
International trade and investment treaties, as well as, investor-state 
contracts, tend to constrain government capacity to introduce public 
interest legislation and regulations.34  Therefore, a host nation may 
lack the institutional structures to enforce laws and regulations.  
Developing host governments may also lack political will in that 
they may be disinclined to impose regulatory constraints on foreign 
corporate actors out of a desire to attract and retain foreign 
investment.35 
This type of structural harm occurs typically as a consequence of 
a multiplicity of individuals, organizations, and institutions acting in 
pursuit of what would otherwise be fruitful endeavors in another 
context. 36  In essence, they are playing by the rules, yet still they are 
causing harm even where it is counter to their intent. 37  “Such 
structural injustice arguably poses new challenges to the problem-
solving capacities of governments.  The roots of such problems are 
not only notoriously complex and difficult to comprehend, but they 
often systematically lie beyond the reach of any one government.”38  
Previously, a distant, local development would have been a 
relatively isolated incident, yet it now has the potential to have far-
reach impacts causing significant global repercussions.39  The ever-
increasing degree of structural interconnectedness that characterizes 
our world today has changed both the nature of harm, as well as, 
that of the governance responses required to prevent and alleviate 
it. 40 
1.4. Research Methods 
This piece utilizes non-doctrinal, empirical research methods to do 
two things.  First, to seek to identify the mechanism within 
contemporary collective governance models that allows structural 
 
 33 Id. at 180. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 181. 
 36 See Wettstein, supra note 6, at 157 (explaining the unintended consequences 
of structured social action). 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See id. at 156 (describing the global increase in structural interconnections). 
 40 Id. 
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harm to perpetuate.  Second, to proffer a new iteration in the evolution 
of the accountability mechanisms of these models.  This concept is 
termed herein as collaborative accountability.  For the purposes of such 
an assessment, doctrinal legal research would have proved 
insufficiently narrow in scope in that it fails to recognize the social 
conditions essential to understanding the problems addressed herein.41  
Rather, non-doctrinal legal research can be said to take a “law in 
context” approach.42  This type of research seeks to transcend 
traditional, silo-ed academic understanding.  It integrates knowledge 
streams from various disciplines in order to create connections 
between these disciplines.  This network allows for deeper insight and 
explanations of complex issues, which no discipline can do single-
handedly.43  Empirical research—analyzing data to draw 
conclusions44—is required to delve into complex societal issues such as 
globalization and sustainable development.45  This is directly relevant 
here, as this piece addresses how globalization’s impact on harm 
inhibits sustainable development. 
As such, interdisciplinary research is particularly relevant in the 
sense that it is necessary to understand the broader scope of the 
problem.  This type of research in general and my research specifically 
 
 41 See Ron van Gestel & Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, Revitalizing Doctrinal Legal 
Research in Europe: What About Methodology? 4 (Eur. U. Inst., Working Papers Law 
2011/05, 2011) 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/16825/LAW_2011_05.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ET3W-CEWP] (explaining the need for the integration of social 
facts in legal methodology). 
 42 See Van Gestel & Micklitz, supra note 41, at 26 (describing the increasing 
support for a “law in context” approach); Law in Action, U. WIS. L. SCH. (2017), 
http://law.wisc.edu/law-in-action/davislawinactionessay.html 
[https://perma.cc/RU2T-PGUC] (detailing the application of law in action 
approach at University of Wisconsin Law School);  see also Paul D. Carrington & 
Erika King, Law and the Wisconsin Idea, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 297 (1997), 
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1154&context=fac
ulty_scholarship, [https://perma.cc/5FSQ-NFBA] (describing the developmental 
history of law in action at the University of Wisconsin). 
 43 See Arild Buanes & Svein Jentoft, Building Bridges: Institutional Perspectives 
on Interdisciplinarity, 41 FUTURES 446, 446–47 (2009) (speaking to the necessity of 
interdisciplinary approaches in order to solve “real world” problems); Am. Ass’n 
for the Advancement of Sci., Facilitating Interdisciplinary Research and Education: A 
Practical Guide 3 (Edward G. Derrick et al. eds., 2012) (describing the potential of 
interdisciplinary research). 
 44 See Van Gestel & Micklitz, supra note 41 (explaining the varied definitions 
of empiricism within legal research). 
 45 See Gunilla Öberg, Facilitating Interdisciplinary Work: Using Quality 
Assessment to Create Common Ground, 57 HIGHER EDUC. 405, 406 (2009) (describing 
both the need for and challenges associated with interdisciplinary work). 
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is useful for transferring information from the “laboratory” to the real 
world.  Principle 1 of the EITI states that “the prudent use of natural 
resource wealth should be an important engine for sustainable 
economic growth that contributes to sustainable development.”46  
Interdisciplinary research is the tool by which one can analyze the 
effectiveness of the EITI’s ability to contribute positively to 
sustainable development.  If its efforts fail in doing so, the EITI needs 
to keep reshaping itself.  By understanding the social contexts of the 
problem, we can better understand the necessary legal steps to 
undertake in the evolutionary process. 
This research, although interdisciplinary, is situated clearly within 
the social sciences.47  Sociology is utilized to define the problem in that 
qualitative social science research is analyzed to determine the 
effectiveness of the EITI.  This assessment relies on the existing data 
and literature from sociological researchers regarding the impact of the 
EITI on regulatory quality across implementing countries.  Ultimately 
though, this research meets at the crossroads of law and political 
science by engaging directly in a review of the impacts of globalization 
on the nature of harm and governance. 48  These concepts are 
fundamentally rooted in political science discourse.  However, the 
piece retains legal character in that it analyzes how concepts such as 
linear liability further perpetuate structural harm.  By analyzing the 
political science trends, one is able to understand how legal concepts of 
liability might continue to evolve in order to mitigate structural harm.  
The object of the research is twofold in that it aims  to further the 
expertise of the field of law, as well as, address a specific social 
problem.  In this way, the piece endeavors to contribute to legal 
academic literature and political policy.49 
 
 46 Clare Short, The Development of the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative, 7 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & BUS. 8, 11–12 (2014). 
 47 See Joyce Tait & Catherine Lyall, Short Guide to Developing Interdisciplinary 
Research Proposals, THE INST. FOR THE STUD. OF SCI., TECH., AND INNOVATION 2 (Mar. 
2007), https://jlesc.github .io/downloads/docs/ISSTI_Briefing_Note_1-
Writing_Interdisciplinary_Research_Proposals.pdf [https://perma.cc/3W8G-
LALF] (defining interdisciplinary research that falls within social sciences). 
 48 See THE OÑATI INT’L INST. FOR THE SOC. OF L., THEORY AND METHOD IN SOCIO-
LEGAL RESEARCH 5 (Reza Banakar & Max Travers eds., 2005) (describing the 
sociological diversity of law). 
 49 See Tait & Lyall, supra note 47, at 2 (describing the use of interdisciplinary 
research in order to further policy goals). 
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2. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE REGULATORY TRANSITION 
2.1. Governance Defined 
As the nature of harm shifts, so must the nature of governance 
in order to best address the harm it seeks to mitigate.  Governance 
is the process of governing, rather than an institution.50  Although 
it is often institutions that do the work of governing, governance is 
about “processes of rule more than institutions of government”.51  
The term “governance” highlights the reality that governing may 
occur in a more collective context without an effective sovereign 
power.  This means that it may be undertaken – as was traditionally 
the case – by a government, but also via the market or another 
governance network.  Governance can occur through hard laws or 
social norms.  It also differs from government in that it focuses less 
on the state and its institutions and more on social practices and 
activities.52  Regulation, in this context, may occur through self-
monitoring, as well as, external supervision.  Similarly, coordination 
between the various governed bodies can be the result of mutual, 
voluntary cooperation among actors, as well as, of rules in a 
hierarchic organization.53  These means of regulation and 
coordination are not mutually exclusive.  For example, both types of 
regulation – self-monitoring and external supervision – can and 
often do occur within a single governance system. 
Global interconnectedness delivers a direct challenge to 
territorial principles of modern social and political organization.54  
Current public problems do not always fall neatly under the 
jurisdiction of a specific agency or even a particular nation.55  
Effective global governance today requires new governing 
strategies to span jurisdictions, link people across all levels of 
government, and mobilize a variety of stakeholders.56  This results 
in a fragmentation of the traditional links between political 
 
 50 BEVIR, supra note 10, at 1. 
 51 BEVIR, supra note 10, at 11. 
 52 BEVIR, supra note 10, at 1. 
 53 BEVIR, supra note 10,  at 82. 
 54 BEVIR, supra note 10, at 4, 83. 
 55 BEVIR, supra note 10, at 4. 
 56 BEVIR, supra note 10, at 4–5. 
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authority and public accountability.57  Global governance extends 
across territorial bounds and – among other objectives – seeks to 
manage the global commons, regulate transnational activities, and 
promote sustainable development.58  Not only have the once distinct 
realms among subnational, national, and international governance 
structures begun to blur, but so has the line between private and 
public governance.59 
The processes of governing now involve more diverse actors and 
more diverse organizational forms.60  Increasingly, governments 
rely on private and voluntary sector actors to manage and deliver 
governance services.61  State power and state action is now dispersed 
among a vast array of spatially and functionally distinct networks 
consisting of all kinds of public, voluntary, and private 
organizations.62  Due to these interdependencies, the regulatory 
power of national governing institutions has become increasingly 
constrained.63  This increasing range and variety of stakeholders has 
led to the emergence of new self-regulatory practices and collective 
institutional designs, ranging from formal CSR schemes to PPPs 
such as the EITI.64  “Governance” in this sense then moves beyond 
the aforementioned abstract definitions and also captures the 
concrete formal and informal responses to the changing global 
order. 65 
Corporations are perceived as powerful forces in the emerging 
new global governance structure, exerting power to a degree that we 
have commonly assumed only with governments.  This new 
situation calls for a deliberative turn in our thinking, not only in 
regard to corporate authority, which embeds corporate decision-
making in the political planning processes,66 but also in the nature 
of corporate accountability.  There is no doubt that large 
 
 57 See Wettstein, supra note 6, at 161 (describing the shift to collaborative 
responsibility). 
 58 BEVIR, supra note 10, at 4, 83. 
 59 See Wettstein, supra note 6, at 161 (describing the blurred distinction 
between the public and private spheres as a product of an emerging transnational 
world order). 
 60 BEVIR, supra note 10, at 3. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 67. 
 63 Id. at 5. 
 64 Id. at 7. 
 65 Id. at 5. 
 66 See Wettstein, supra note 6, at 173 (describing the role of corporate 
responsibility as political responsibility). 
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corporations are among those institutions with the most profound 
potential to impact today’s global structures.  Thus, they should 
naturally also be among those institutions that bear a responsibility 
to contribute toward positive improvement of our global 
problems.67  This recognition, combined with the weakening power 
of national governments, has resulted in a call for a shift from 
external regulatory oversight of corporate entities toward increased 
self-monitoring behaviors. 
2.2. The Regulatory Transition: From External Supervision to 
Voluntary Self-Monitoring 
The existing international governance system was built on a 
state-centric model characterized by hard national borders and 
mutually exclusive territorial jurisdiction.  In such a system, 
economic activity and international relations were linear, organized, 
and conducted via a defined process.68  Under this Westphalian 
world order, each state possessed its own independent and 
sovereign regulatory powers.69  Power was abrogated from the state 
to the international level through state consent.  Without such 
consent, international mechanisms lacked legitimacy.  While some 
element of shared interests and institutions existed at the 
international level, such a state-centric structure impinged the 
development of international norms, and implies – arguably even 
requires – that norms at the international level are weaker than 
national or subnational norms.70 
Under this framework, international law presupposes that 
nations will exercise regulatory oversight over transnational 
corporations operating within their territory to ensure that the 
activities of such entities do not violate the rights – whether social, 
civil, or contractual – of individuals and communities under 
national jurisdiction.  However, as demonstrated, due to 
globalization’s impact on the nature of harm and corporate entities 
 
 67 See id. at 170 (arguing for proactive company engagement in addressing 
global injustices). 
 68 See Kobrin, supra note 22, at 359 (explaining the scope of private obligations 
in a Westphalian context). 
 69 See id. at 365 (examining the relationship between transnational corporation 
responsibility vis a vis the state). 
 70 See id. at 359 (describing the limited power of international norms under a 
Westphalian order). 
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role in contributing to that harm, this type of national oversight is 
proving ineffective.  Continued operation under a territorial 
oversight model will only further entrench the accountability gap 
leaving many transnational companies under-regulated and the 
structural harm caused unaddressed.  As such, it has become 
increasingly argued that collective governance mechanisms, rather 
than the independent and isolated hierarchical legal regimes 
characterized by the Westphalian world order, might prove more 
effective at simultaneously strengthening national and subnational 
regulatory quality and corporate accountability.71 
This is the case for several reasons.  At a minimum, it would 
prove difficult to extend the hierarchical “hard law” regime beyond 
national borders given the lack of an overarching authority within 
the international governance system.72  Further, assuming the 
existence of such an authority, it is unlikely that the international 
community could agree on a meaningful set of standards regarding 
the responsibilities of private actors, and the extent to which such 
actors should be held accountable.73  Supposing the international 
community performed this arduous task of agreeing on a set of 
standards, enforcement is likely to remain implausible.74  While the 
international system is becoming increasingly less state centered, 
states continue to remain the most prominent and powerful actors 
and are not likely to cede sovereignty to an international institution 
to impose obligations on transnational corporations.75  Therefore, 
the most likely outcome would be to establish indirect obligations 
on companies by holding nations responsible for corporate 
behavior.76  That would be problematic as nations are already 
reluctant to intervene across borders to protect human rights 
directly and may be even less likely to do so through the convoluted 
network of transnational firms.77  Additionally, “[t]here are marked 
differences across states—even among the industrialized 
countries—in terms of beliefs about the market versus regulation, 
 
 71 BEVIR, supra note 10, at 5. 
 72 See Kobrin, supra note 22, at 364 (detailing the challenges associated with 
imposing international authority over transnational corporations). 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 361. 
 76 See id. at 364 (arguing for the need for a transnational solution akin to ISO 
standards). 
 77 Id. at 364–65. 
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the relationship between corporations and government, and the 
power of the corporate community.”78 
Beyond these difficulties lies the more philosophical and 
nuanced point that imposing human rights obligations on 
transnational firms “through ‘hard’ international law is 
anachronistic.”79  Reinforcing this system today is an attempt to 
impose a solution derived from the Westphalian international 
system on a post-Westphalian collective world.  It is becoming 
increasingly clear that the realities of today’s globalized society are 
in direct opposition to this principle of territoriality that has 
characterized the modern approach to global governance.80  While 
the recognition that private actors such as transnational firms could 
be subjects of international law, and therefore liable under that 
system, may be heralded as a significant legal development of the 
early twenty-first century, it is nonetheless “an attempt to force a 
square peg into a round hole, an attempt to adapt state-centric 
international law to a multi-actor environment.”81  In order to properly 
address structural harm, collective governance will have to continue 
to evolve past this notion of direct and linear accountability 
enshrined in the existing hierarchical frameworks.82  It follows then 
that more contemporary globalization has been marked by a 
transition away from a state-centric world order toward a multi-
actor collective governance system.83  A fundamental purpose of the 
Westphalian world order was to set norms and rules surrounding 
the decision-making process around which various actors could 
rely.84  To some extent the emerging collective regimes reflect an 
absence of public governance in the global arena.85  “[W]hen 
 
 78 See id. at 365 (speaking to the difficulty of coalescing around common 
interests in a post-Westphalian world). 
 79 Id. (citing Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Shifting the Point of Regulation: The 
International Organization for Standardization and Global Lawmaking on Trade and the 
Environment, 22 Ecology L. Q. 479 (1995)). 
 80 See Wettstein, supra note 6, at 156–57 (arguing that the biggest challenge to 
the “territorial principle” is the growing number of global issues that various 
countries face). 
 81 Kobrin, supra note 22, at 365 (emphasis added). 
 82 See id. at 361 (arguing that a non-hierarchical human rights compliance 
mechanism is more feasible in light of states’ reluctance to cede sovereignty to a 
transnational human rights authority). 
 83 Wettstein, supra note 6, at 161. 
 84 See Kobrin, supra note 22, at 352–53 (describing the historical context of 
notions of sovereignty under the Westphalian order). 
 85 Id. at 365. 
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governments are unwilling or unable to govern effectively, political 
leaders may see private governance as a valuable tool to achieve 
public ends.”86 
In a related trend, ideas surrounding the promotion of corporate 
accountability have shifted away from the promotion of external 
oversight that is characteristic of hierarchical regimes.  This shift has 
been one toward self-monitoring.  This is consistent with the 
increasingly recognized and accepted notion that companies have a 
responsibility to the societies in which they operate beyond those 
enshrined in the law,87 and that managing solely on behalf of 
shareholders at the expense of other external stakeholders cannot 
sustain performance.88  Globalized communication networks have 
further strengthened the ability of these external stakeholders to 
detect and publicize wrongdoing.  Pressure from such stakeholders 
has forced companies to recognize that industry does not exist in a 
vacuum.89  This pressure, combined with frequent weak legal 
standards, corrupt governments, and non-peaceful means of 
resolving social conflict characteristic of developing countries,90 has 
forced many companies seeking to minimize risk to self-regulate in 
the form of formal, but almost entirely, internal CSR models.91 
There currently exists a widespread acceptance of CSR among 
corporate actors rising out of the notion that reputational harm can 
be as detrimental as legal liability.  However, there exists a wide 
variation between CSR models across business enterprises.92  
 
 86 VIRGINIA HAUFLER, A PUBLIC ROLE FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR: INDUSTRY SELF-
REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 29 (2001). 
 87 See David Spence, Corporate Social Responsibility in the Oil and Gas Industry: 
The Importance of Reputational Risk, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 61–62 (2011) (defining 
“corporate social responsibility” as an idea that there is an affirmative duty of 
corporations beyond those enshrined in law). 
 88 Id. at 67–68 (quoting R. EDWARD FREEMAN, JEFFRY S. HARRISON, & ANDREW C. 
WICKS, MANAGING FOR STAKEHOLDERS: SURVIVAL, REPUTATION, AND SUCCESS 3–4 
(2007)). 
 89 See id. at 61 (noting that increasingly “business is done out in the open” in 
the new age of instant communication). 
 90 See id. at 71 (noting that legal standards may be weak or non-existent in 
developing countries). 
 91 See Matthew Genasci & Sarah Pray, Extracting Accountability: The 
Implications of the Resource Curse for CSR Theory and Practice, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & 
DEV. J. 37, 40 (2008) (arguing that a corporate social responsibility policy may offer 
companies a better alternative to government regulation); Spence, supra note 87, at 
59. 
 92 See Spence, supra note 87, at 76 (noting that international oil companies 
increasingly embrace CSRs because reputational harm, like legal liability, may 
diminish positive financial returns in the long run). 
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Therefore a definition, let alone a set of norms, for CSR is almost 
entirely lacking.93  Despite this, many corporations continue to 
engage in CSR efforts in an attempt to balance their best interests 
against the desires of the communities in which they do business.94  
While CSR has laudable sustainability goals, it has been heavily 
criticized.  At a minimum, it is often seen as ineffective and 
uneconomic: as mere window dressing that is nothing more than 
unfairly spending shareholders’ money in ways from which they do 
not profit.95  This criticism has not fallen on deaf ears.  Rather, a 
number of corporate entities are furthering their means of self-
monitoring through voluntary participation in sector-specific 
public-private partnerships.  These collaborative attempts96 take the 
CSR model one step further and promote systemic community 
development by assisting governments in developing “both the will 
and the capacity to protect human rights, provide security and 
public services, and be accountable to their people.”97 
These non-hierarchical collective governance mechanisms take 
the concept of corporate regulation a step further beyond self-
monitoring.  These mechanisms promote the concept of co-
regulation, which is quite a conceptual shift from the regulation 
method of external oversight that is characteristic of hierarchical 
regimes.  Many of these non-hierarchical collective governance 
mechanisms are commonly taking the form of PPPs.  PPPs consist of 
one or more public sector actors combining with one or more private 
or voluntary sector actors to form a collective governance 
mechanism.  PPPs bring public sector and other actors together to 
coproduce policies and services.  This emphasis on coproduction 
explains some of the other characteristics of PPPs.  Here, actors have 
an enduring relationship.  They actively collaborate with one 
another rather than merely entering into a contract.98  Each actor 
brings one or more key resources to the partnership in the form of 
 
 93 See Genasci & Pray, supra note 91, at 40 (contending that NGOs and 
corporations have different meanings for CSRs). 
 94 See Spence, supra note 87, at 84 (arguing that oil company CSRs are designed 
to fill the regulatory void in countries that lack good governance). 
 95 See id. at 66–67 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 419–
20 (Little, Brown & Co. Law Book Div., 4th ed. 1992)). 
 96 See id. at 80–81 (using the World Bank’s Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (“EITI”) as an example of a type of public partnership approach to CSRs)). 
 97 Id. at 80–82. 
 98 BEVIR, supra note 10, at 68. 
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finance, property, authority, or legitimacy,99 joining the corporate 
sector, governments and civil society together in a common cause.100  
Non-hierarchical collective governance mechanisms such as the EITI 
are consistent with the evolving transnational order; it is within such 
frameworks that one has to sketch the outlines of the next iteration 
of collective global governance.  “That is a difficult task given that 
the process of systemic change has just begun to unfold and that 
only dim outlines of its eventual endpoint are visible.”101 
2.3. Elements of Collective Governance 
In political science and legal scholarship, the term “new 
governance” describes a broad range of governance forms and 
modalities that depart from the above described hierarchical 
command-and-control regulation.  The term law is sometimes 
equated with and confined to such command-and-control 
regulation, whereas “new governance is envisaged as existing 
largely apart from and beyond law, as an amorphous cluster of new 
processes, instruments and values.”102  The parameters of new 
governance have not been definitively resolved, but there exists 
agreement as to certain constitutive elements: collaboration, 
transparency, stakeholder participation, and adaptability. 103 
First, new governance envisages an approach to regulation that 
is more collaborative than traditional forms of regulation in terms of 
the relationship between the regulator and the regulated.  Second, 
new governance regulatory initiatives give more freedom to the 
regulated to determine their internal means of compliance, while at 
the same time requiring transparency.  Third, new governance 
approaches tend to include broad stakeholder participation and 
voice.104  This collective governance approach seeks to involve a 
broad array of stakeholders from non-governmental organizations, 
citizens’ movements, multinational corporations, and the global 
 
 99 Id. 
 100 See Wettstein, supra note 6, at 162 (noting the increase in partnerships 
between businesses and public institutions to tackle some of the world’s most 
pressing problems). 
 101 Kobrin, supra note 22, at 361. 
 102 SIMONS & MACKLIN, supra note 21, at 13. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
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capital market.  Under this model, the existing institutional system 
would remain central with a focus on improving the means of 
collaboration across the various institutions at the international level 
and between these institutions: the individual communities; 
national, regional, and local governments; private entities; and 
NGOs.105  The purpose of transparency and stakeholder 
participation within collective governance mechanisms is in an 
attempt to foster accountability.  Finally, new governance is 
adaptable in that it emphasizes problem-solving and experimentation 
in the ongoing design of regulatory strategies.  The remainder of this 
chapter will elaborate upon those more clearly defined concepts—
transparency and stakeholder engagement—which relate directly to 
accountability.  This framework will be used as a basis for the 
analysis of the EITI.  The more nuanced elements of collaboration 
and adaptability will be developed more throughout Chapter 4. 
2.3.1. Transparency 
Collective governance is characterized by what is referred to as 
governance by disclosure, or in other words, a push for transparency.  
Governance by disclosure has become a defining feature of 
collective global governance models.  “To an increasing extent, 
private actors such as firms and non-governmental organizations 
are becoming involved in the design and operation of transnational 
rules that aim to increase transparency.”106  Examples of these 
schemes can be found across diverse sectors, including labor rights, 
environmental protection, accounting, and telecommunications.107  
Transparency as a regulatory strategy is based on the assumption 
that reporting will generate information, which can be used to hold 
companies accountable.  Access to information allows various 
stakeholders, including members of the wider public, to pressure 
corporations to modify their conduct.108   Regulation of corporate 
activity through disclosure is an approach that presents a midway 
 
 105 BEVIR, supra note 10, at 107. 
 106 Sovacool, supra note 13, at 179. 
 107 Id. 
 108 BEVIR, supra note 10, at 109–11; SIMONS & MACKLIN, supra note 21, at 150. 
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solution between strict external oversight mechanisms and the 
purely voluntary self-monitoring found within CSR models.109 
Political scientists, legal analysts, governance scholars, and 
ethicists have argued that transparency—defined as “timely and 
reliable economic, social, and political information accessible to all 
relevant stakeholders”—can partially counteract some aspects of 
structural harm, as well as, improve social welfare and regulatory 
quality.110  A host of progress objectives—anti-corruption, poverty 
reduction, sustainable development, economic growth, and better 
governance—may be attributed to and catalyzed by the simple act 
of transparent accounting alone.111  However, critics respond that 
this claim is too good to be true and that these researchers are merely 
presuming that such a link between transparency and better 
governance exists.112  To ensure better governance, it is imperative 
to recognize the distinction as well as the interplay between 
transparency and accountability.  “The right to information is not 
accountability in itself, but is instrumental to it, and transparency 
does not automatically produce accountability but is a necessary but 
insufficient condition for it.”113  The benefits of transparency are 
contextual, and dependent on aspects like the capacity of the 
population to understand and use the information and the 
accountability mechanisms that can sanction nontransparent 
behavior.114  This translation and dissemination of information does 
not tend to happen where institutions are weak.115  Therefore, 
although accountability requires transparency, transparency does not 
necessarily beget accountability. 
 
 109 Cf. Andrews, supra note 7, at 60 (arguing that the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative does not “absolutely eradicate” the accountability and 
ethical issues that corporations face). 
 110 Sovacool, supra note 13, at 181. 
 111 Sara Bracking, Hiding Conflicts over Industry Returns: A Stakeholder Analysis 
of The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 4 (Brooks World Poverty Inst., 
Working Paper 91, 2009). 
 112 See Sovacool, supra note 13, at 180 (citing metrics to argue that countries did 
not perform better once subject to EITI compliance standards). 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 See Hans Pitlik, Björn Frank & Mathias Firchow, The Demand for 
Transparency: An Emperical Note, 5 REV. INT’L ORG. 177, 178 (2010) (using empirical 
evidence to show that most resource-rich countries suffer from poor institutions 
and a lack of transparency). 
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2.3.2. Stakeholder Engagement 
Another method utilized by collective governance mechanisms 
in attempts to foster accountability is the creation of a multi-
stakeholder group.  These groups comprise representatives from 
various disciplines and functions across government, industry, and 
civil society.  The goal behind such a diverse group is two-fold.  First, 
this mechanism seeks to ensure cross-sector representation in the 
decision-making process.  Each group is representative of a diverse 
set of ideas.  This representation promotes democratic processes 
through public participation.  Secondly, such a group functions as a 
checks-and-balances system where the primary role of civil society 
is to hold government and industry accountable.  Their paramount 
purpose is consciousness-raising.116  Within sector specific 
governance mechanisms these organizations typically operate by 
distilling and disseminating report finding to communities.  The 
goal of this communication is to raise awareness in order to promote 
reform.117 
Like transparency, the multi-stakeholder nature of this 
framework does not necessarily beget accountability.  This is 
especially the case in developing nations.  Often the general public 
is not aware of the existence of the governance mechanism nor is it 
able to comprehend the content of such reports.118  Without basic 
levels of awareness and comprehension, it is not possible for such 
efforts to achieve accountability.  Additionally, research 
demonstrates that the partnership between civil society and 
government is a limited one where governments have not allowed 
full civil society participation in the process.119  Naturally, such a 
partnership raises questions about civil society’s independence and 
whether this relationship inhibits its role as a critical watchdog.120  
Such relationships between industry and government call to mind 
similar questions regarding corporate motivations in that these 
 
 116 See GLOBAL URBAN JUSTICE: THE RISE OF HUMAN RIGHTS CITIES 61 (Barbara 
Oomen, Martha Davis & Michele Grigolo eds., 2016) (arguing that civic groups 
improve human rights consciousness by raising awareness of human rights issues). 
 117 Id. at 56. 
 118 See Andrews, supra note 7, at 71 (arguing that a limitation of the 
transparency goals of Ghana’s compliance with the Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative was a lack of awareness of the initiative by the local 
population). 
 119 Id. 
 120 GLOBAL URBAN JUSTICE, supra note 116, at 58. 
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relationships fail to recognize the perils of influence.121  Critics argue 
that the public is better served when struggle between the public 
and private sector exists.  The danger of collaboration in this way 
with industry presents an opportunity to “conflate the common 
good with common ground.”122  It allows industry to frame public 
concerns in a way that is most beneficial, in other words, least 
threatening to their commercial interests.123 
3. AN EXAMPLE OF COLLECTIVE GOVERNANCE: THE EXTRACTIVE 
INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE 
To add context and a level of specificity, the next two chapters will 
utilize the EITI as a focal point to illustrate how the aforementioned 
general concepts of collective governance mechanisms operate within 
one, notably opaque, industry sector—the extractive industry.  The first 
section will expand specifically on the type of structural harm caused 
by the presence of extractive industries in the developing country 
context.  It will be followed by a discussion of how the industry seeks 
to self-regulate through the EITI and finish with an analysis of the 
EITI’s effectiveness as a global governance mechanism.  The EITI 
initiative is fueled by the growing intersection between civil society 
led social movements on the one hand and the corporate sector on 
the other.124  “Governments play an important role by leading the 
initiative, making the multi-stakeholder arrangement an example of 
what has become known as ‘collective governance.’”125 
3.1. The Reason Behind the EITI – The Resource Curse 
It is not only well documented that weak governance resulting 
in poor regulatory quality is compounded in the context of 
developing nations;126 but additionally—by their very nature—
 
 121 Jonathan Marks, Associate Professor of Bioethics, Human. and L., 
TEDxPSU at University Park: In Praise of Conflict (Feb. 12, 2017). 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 See Andrews, supra note 7, at 60–61 (describing the underlying motivation 
for the establishment of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative). 
 125 Id. at 60. 
 126 SIMONS & MACKLIN, supra note 21, at 16. 
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extractive operations are rife with inherently dangerous activities 
due to the simultaneously technical and mechanical nature of such 
operations.127  Due to the hazardous nature of mineral extraction, the 
magnitude of risk assumed by those engaged in resource 
development spans a broad spectrum including environmental, 
health and safety, liability, as well as, reputational.128  “The business 
of exploring for and producing [resources] will always entail 
environmental costs and social challenges.”129  In developed 
countries, mitigation and regulation of these risks is done through 
the rule of law in the form of regulation.130  While regulatory failure 
or human error cannot be entirely prevented, it is expected in 
industrialized democracies that the legal system will structure 
relationships between corporations and external stakeholders in a 
manner that provides redress for harm and fairly apportions 
liability.131  The risks assumed are further compounded by the social 
and political contexts in which extraction companies often operate, 
as this relationship is often non-existent in the context of developing 
nations either due to a dearth of regulation or inadequate 
enforcement thereof.  “Therefore, societies look to [extractive] 
companies to self-regulate: to do more to guard against risks to 
society than merely comply with the law.”132  Corporate entities 
within the extractive industry may not be able to void finding 
themselves in such a position.  These corporations are constrained 
by the location of resources.  Companies must operate where 
minerals are found.  Companies within the extractive industries are 
therefore more likely than other industries to find themselves in 
areas of weak governance due to this lack of mobility.133 
Such direct corporate self-regulation proves difficult for several 
reasons.134  Extractive industries are often under political control, 
meaning that there exists rampant blurring of the lines between 
public, shareholder, and personal interests. This is especially true in 
the case of state owned companies.135  Additionally, there exists 
 
 127 See Spence, supra note 87, at 59 (citing the Deep-Water Horizon oil spill as 
an example of the dangers involved in extractive industries). 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 84. 
 130 Id. at 60. 
 131 Id. at 70. 
 132 Id. at 60. 
 133 SIMONS & MACKLIN, supra note 21, at 16. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Sovacool, supra note 13, at 187. 
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limited competition in the extractive sector,136 which results in fewer 
transnational checks and balances compared to more competitive 
sectors.137  Further, the channels of integration for resource rich 
countries into the global economy are often limited, opening 
avenues for illicit financial flows.138  Finally, the complex processes 
of extractive sectors require technical and financial expertise.  This 
leads to companies, rather than countries, doing much of the 
accounting for tax payments, especially in developing countries, 
which leaves room for misappropriation in cases where reliable 
auditing is limited.139 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s—paralleling the academic 
discussions surrounding globalization—there was growing 
international recognition of, and attention paid to, the phenomenon 
of the resource curse.  The term “resource curse” has been coined to 
describe the phenomena that occur when countries continue to 
exhibit comparatively high levels of poverty and inequality, 
deteriorating environmental quality, institutionalized corruption, 
and an increased frequency of conflict despite decades of natural 
resource development.140  According to resource curse scholars, 
while revenue from oil, gas, and mining companies in the form of 
taxes, royalties, signature bonuses, and other payments is expected 
to be an important engine for economic growth and social 
development in resource-rich countries, the lack of accountability 
and transparency in these revenues “often aggravates poor 
governance and leads to corruption, conflict, and poverty.”141  For 
example, in the Niger Delta, after years of oil exploration and 
production, the lives of average citizens have remained relatively 
stagnant even though oil companies have a number of CSR 
initiatives targeted at bettering the lives of people.142 
 
 136 Jon Yeomans, Revealed: The Biggest Companies in the World in 2016, THE 
TELEGRAPH (June 20, 2016), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/07/20/revealed-the-biggest-
companies-in-the-world-in-2016/ [https://perma.cc/S4XR-2BJ7] (stating five of 
the top ten Fortune 500 companies were oil and gas companies suggesting that the 
technological resources are concentrated within a few large transnational players 
rather than a multiplicity of smaller players. The remaining five companies were 
from retail, energy, automotive and tech). 
 137 Sovacool, supra note 13, at 187. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. at 180. 
 141 Andrews, supra note 7, at 61. 
 142 Id. at 64. 
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This is just one example of where the potential benefits of natural 
resource wealth are not being realized.143  Paradoxically, such 
wealth is routinely associated with a litany of problems, including: 
currency appreciation; the decline of non-resource sectors – 
commonly referred to as the Dutch Disease; tax system failures, such 
as revenue capture by elites due to a break down in the 
accountability that results from tax collection; as well as the 
exacerbation of regional and community tensions.144  Corruption 
and opacity plague those countries and companies involved in 
resources extraction.145  Additionally, it has been established that the 
collusion between corporations and government officials further 
compounds the adverse consequences of resource wealth.146  
However, the extent of the resource curse is contingent on multiple 
factors including political incentives, the types of resources the 
country in question has, and the nature of rent seeking.147 
These structural obstacles seem to be best counteracted (or 
otherwise avoided altogether) by particular structural advantages.  
More specifically, counter-weights to this resource curse appear to 
be political stability, economic diversification, and active civil 
society engagement.148  The presence of these problems and the 
absence of their counterbalancing structural advantages presents a 
wide range of governance challenges that quickly outstretches 
developing nations capacity, including: the need to develop fair, 
efficient, and inclusive systems for licensing; bidding; contracting; 
revenue collection; auditing; and public spending.149  Increasingly, 
environmental and social impacts of these industries became causes 
of complaint.  Even though it was widely recognized that there was 
no single reform that on its own could effectively address all of these 
problems, a common conclusion was that greater transparency and 
dialogue between stakeholders must be part of the solution.150  The 
EITI was developed in response to the resource curse and in an 
attempt to fill this governance void. 
 
 143 Short, supra note 46, at 8. 
 144 Id. 
 145 SIMONS & MACKLIN, supra note 21, at 16. 
 146 Andrews, supra note 7, at 63. 
 147 Id. at 63–64. 
 148 Id. at 64. 
 149 Short, supra note 46, at 8. 
 150 Id. at 9. 
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3.2. An Overview of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative: 
What is the EITI and How does it Operate? 
The EITI offers a useful template by which to assess the value of 
collective governance mechanisms, if any, on the international 
stage.151  The EITI is one example of a collective governance 
mechanism that seeks to address the above-described structural harm 
caused by the presence of extractive industries within developing 
nations.  It is a trans-national public-private partnership supported 
by a coalition of government, companies, and civil society that takes 
a sector-specific, multi-stakeholder approach to create an 
international governance framework in an attempt to 
simultaneously promote regulation by governments and corporate 
responsibility within the extractive industry.152  Partnership 
initiatives such as the EITI seek to bring industry and government 
sectors together in nation-building.153  Generally speaking, nation-
building efforts seeks to promote governance structures, improve 
workforce conditions, build transparent and productive 
relationships between business enterprises and the government, 
and reduce corruption.154  The EITI defines itself as “a global 
standard to promote the open and accountable management of oil, 
gas and mineral resources” and address governance issues within 
the industry.155  It recognizes that poor natural resource governance 
leads to corruption, conflict, and the mismanagement of these 
resources and their associated profits.  Consequently, stagnating 
social development and economic growth rather than utilizing this 
wealth for public benefit.156 
Put simply, the EITI is about ensuring that citizens have access 
to reliable and useful information regarding how much their 
governments receive from the exploitation of their nation’s finite oil, 
gas, and mineral resources.  To achieve this, EITI implementation 
has two core components – transparency and stakeholder 
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engagement.157  The transparency prong requires oil, gas, and 
mining companies to disclose their payments to the government; 
and the government, its receipts.  The figures are reconciled by an 
independent administrator and published in annual EITI Reports 
alongside contextual information about the extractive sector.  The 
second prong is the creation of the multi-stakeholder group.  The 
multi-stakeholder group is comprised of representatives from 
government, companies, and civil society.  It is established to 
oversee the accounting, auditing, and reporting processes and is 
charged with disseminating the findings of the EITI Reports.  More 
broadly, it should promote the integration of the EITI domestically, 
as well as extractive industry reform efforts.  The overarching goal 
of these two prongs is to enhance accountability within the 
extractive sector by strengthening both government and corporate 
governance systems.158 
3.2.1. A Developmental Timeline of The EITI 
The EITI was created in 2002 to improve the domestic 
governance in resource-rich countries by bringing global 
accountability to the collection of revenues.159  The idea came about 
as a way to avert the specific type of structural harm caused by the 
presence of extractive industries in developing nations.160  In 2003, 
the EITI’s Statement of Principles (Principles)161 was agreed to, 
centering on the need for the transparent management of natural 
resources.162  The EITI Principles recognize the importance of the 
“prudent use of natural resource wealth” for sustainable 
development, as well as, the sovereign right of states over their 
natural resources.163  In accordance with the aforementioned 
discussion on collective governance mechanisms, these twelve 
Principles enshrined two key prongs: transparency and stakeholder 
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engagement.  An underlying rationale of the EITI is that these 
elements will remove the blinds that make the extractive industries 
opaque.164  The Principles set forth a workable approach to the 
disclosure of payments to governments by corporations within the 
extractive industry with the notion that public understanding of 
these revenues would assist public debate and inform decisions 
surrounding appropriate and realistic options for sustainable 
development.165  Over 40 institutional investors signed a statement 
of support for the EITI under the assumption that this type of 
information disclosure would improve corporate governance and 
reduce operational risk.166 
The Principles were incorporated into the initial EITI Standard 
(Standard) launched in 2011.167  The Standard set out 21 specific 
Requirements for EITI implementing countries, including 
provisions on sign-up, preparation, disclosure, dissemination, 
review, validation, and compliance.168  Only two of these 
Requirements are directives to corporations.  The remainder almost 
exclusively set out guidelines for governments.169  At their inception, 
these Requirements were a set of minimum standards. The Standard 
was first revised in 2013,170 and again in 2016.  Each iteration of 
Requirements builds upon the previous set.171  The 2013 changes had 
five broad aims: (1) making EITI reports more comprehensible; (2) 
increasing the relevance of the EITI through national dialogue; (3) 
enhancing disclosure requirements; (4) improving the validation 
system in order to recognize countries that exceed the minimum 
requirements; and (5) making the Requirements more coherent.172  
More specifically, the 2013 Standard enhanced countries’ role in the 
implementation of the EITI domestically by introducing new 
disclosure requirements, including but not limited to information 
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surrounding the transfer of national funds to subnational entities, 
disclosure of corporate social contributions where contractually 
required, and reporting of financial transfers between state owned 
companies and other government entities.173 
Until the adoption of these enhanced Standards, there was a 
danger that EITI reporting simply ticked boxes but did not actually 
lead to improved transparency.  Successful EITI implementation at 
the national level hinges on the ability of the process to develop to 
meet the diverse on-the-ground challenges present in each country 
in order to encourage reform of the underlying systems.  For 
example, in some countries, corruption is a significant challenge and 
EITI reporting assists in that it is the first step in verifying these 
funds and assuring their proper accounting.174  Other countries face 
other challenges, such as building trust in local communities.175  This 
makes extractive sector governance and regulatory quality a priority 
warranting a greater focus on sub-national transfers and operations 
in local communications.176  In all the countries, data must be 
reported to relevant populations in such a way that it leads to 
informed debate, which would ideally result in better management 
of the extractive sector within that community.177  The adoption of 
the 2013 Standard encourages implementing countries to go beyond 
the minimum requirements where appropriate.178  Further, it calls 
on multi-stakeholder groups to set implementation objectives that 
are reflective of national priorities.179  The multi-stakeholder groups 
are also encouraged to be innovative in regard to the methods of 
public reporting, keeping in mind that the primary goal of reporting 
is to increase comprehension in order to foster accountability across 
the industry.180  This innovation can take reporting to a higher level 
than simple accounting audits.  It has led to some countries 
requiring disclosure of the nature and content of contracts, and 
where not disclosed, an explanation why publishing was not 
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feasible.181  The 2013 Standard requires transparency beyond 
revenue payments from companies to governments, including 
disclosure of licensing information, sales by state-owned companies, 
and significant social payments made by companies.  It also requires 
that reports provide contextual information on questions such as tax 
arrangements, proportion of government revenues from extractives, 
quantity of production, and likely exhaustion dates, so that a 
member of the wider public reading the report would be better able 
to understand the contributions and implications of the presence of 
the extractive industry to their economy and society.182 
The 2016 changes await their 2020 implementation, but they 
make a particularly noteworthy addition to the 2013 Standards.183  
“The most groundbreaking aspect of the 2016 EITI Standard is that 
the identity of those that own and profit from extractive activities 
must now be disclosed.  All countries must ensure that the 
companies that bid for, operate or invest in extractive projects 
declare who their beneficial owners are.”184  Identifying who owns 
extractive companies and disseminating this beneficial ownership 
information will enhance the public’s ability to expose corruption 
and to hold corporations accountable.185 
3.2.2. EITI Operations 
In order to be recognized as an EITI implementing country, the 
government of a nation needs to apply for “EITI Candidature.”186  A 
number of sign-up steps is required, including constituting the 
multi-stakeholder group.  Once the country has been accepted as a 
candidate she has 1.5 years to publish an initial EITI Report and 2.5 
years to complete the validation process.187  The EITI Board conducts 
a validation process to assess a country’s progress in complying 
with each of the Requirements outlined in the Standard.188  Detailed 
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guidance on the process is set out in the EITI Validation Guide.189  
Countries that satisfy the requirements are designated compliant.190  
If a country is deemed non-compliant it may either be suspended191 
or delisted192 from EITI membership.  Suspension is a temporary 
mechanism.  The suspension may be lifted at any time the board 
deems the matter resolved.  At that time, a country’s compliant 
status would be reinstated.193  The Board also reserves the right to 
revoke a country’s status “where it is manifestly clear that a 
significant aspect of the EITI Principles and Requirements are not 
adhered to.”194  A country has the right to appeal either decision by 
the Board.195 
To date, there are 52 implementing countries.196  Since its 
inception, the EITI has reconciled and disclosed USD $2.3 trillion in 
revenues paid by the extractive industries to governments.197  Over 
750 people serve on EITI multi-stakeholder groups and 350 people 
around the world work full time on the EITI.198  Moreover, the 
European Union, African Union, G8 and G20, and the United 
Nations have all endorsed the EITI.199  Compliance and candidacy 
under the EITI is perceived to carry with it a vast array of benefits 
for countries and corporations.  Countries use EITI membership to 
strengthen the investment climate.200  It is a signal to investors and 
financial institutions that there will be increased transparency, 
accountability, and governance.  For corporations and investors, 
doing business in these countries reduces political and reputational 
risk.201 
With implementing governments from all continents committed 
to reforms and openness to varying degrees and with varying levels 
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of economic development, many more specific factors motivate EITI 
implementation, all of which are based on the following 
assumptions.  The primary assumption is that greater transparency 
leads to less corruption within political elites, collusion between 
governments and companies, and mismanagement of funds.202  
Additionally, following an internationally recognized standard 
demonstrates a general commitment to openness and reform.203  It 
is further assumed that EITI compliance will ensure that both 
corporate and governmental accounting and auditing systems are 
functioning efficiently and effectively.  Lastly, in practice these 
accounting and auditing processes—the transparency 
mechanisms—are self-reinforcing, meaning that undertaking these 
endeavors will not only identify accounting errors, but also will 
highlight opportunities to reform and strengthen these systems.204 
“The EITI [therefore] operates on the principle of having free, 
full, independent, and active assessments of the ways that various 
companies within the extractive industries interact with 
government and impact communities and society.”205  Presently, the 
EITI targets host state behavior by providing information about 
payments to governments by extractive industry companies.206  The 
hope is that this information, once in the hands of citizens, will be a 
tool for accountability and a catalyst for necessary reform.207  As 
such, this financial information plays into the larger agenda of host 
state governance and host state regulation of corporate actors, but 
for the time being it only indirectly addresses the conduct of 
transnational corporations.208 
Like other multi-stakeholder initiatives, EITI has evolved from a 
set of ideals to a governance “regime” with norms, membership 
criteria, compliance processes, and a governance structure.  The 
underlying intent of the EITI is that through proper financial 
disclosure, these corporate and governmental institutions and their 
respective actors will become empowered to perform their 
development-oriented role.209  Although the EITI’s work appears to 
 
 202 Short, supra note 46, at 12. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Sovacool, supra note 13, at 179. 
 206 SIMONS & MACKLIN, supra note 21, at 151. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Andrews, supra note 7, at 64. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss4/3
2019] ETI as a Model for Collaborative Accountability 873 
have established transparency as a norm within extractive industry 
governance—a feat in its own right—the utility of this norm is still 
up for debate.  To examine the validity of the critics’ claims, an 
analysis of the EITI will be conducted herein.  However, the mere 
existence of this debate should be sufficient to challenge us to be 
modest and to examine critically the practical utility of global norms, 
particularly those that are based on voluntary compliance.210  
Achieving transparency may not be the cure-all it has been lauded 
to be, especially where civil society is not strong enough to convert 
the information received into accountability.211 
3.3. Effectiveness of the EITI 
It was once widely thought that PPPs would be an all-
encompassing governance solution,212 but despite best efforts, the 
effectiveness of the EITI is constrained by many factors including 
illiteracy, livelihood demands, lack of interest, as well as cultural 
and political factors.213  In many developing countries, particularly 
in Africa, public discussion of extractive industry revenues and civil 
society activity is discouraged, which inhibits development.214  The 
EITI makes the claim that it contributes positively to the 
achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.215  But, based 
on recent social science research, there is seemingly little marked 
evidence that it does.216  It merits noting, however, that it is difficult 
to quantify the effects of EITI reporting because intangibles such as 
corruption, trust, and capacity do not lend themselves to easily 
quantifiable metrics.217 
Previous studies have examined the emergence, 
institutionalization, and accountability mechanisms of transnational 
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standards for transparency, but less is known about their 
effectiveness.218  The study explored in this section statistically 
analyzes the efficacy of transnational disclosure standards of the 
EITI.219  For these purposes effectiveness is defined based on 
whether the transparency engendered by the EITI actually results in 
better governance and development outcomes in EITI compliant 
countries by looking at eight distinct metrics: accountability; 
political stability; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule 
of law, corruption; foreign direct investment; and growth in per 
capita GDP.220  Researchers looked at two research categories to 
determine EITI effectiveness.  The first category was whether there 
were significant differences in the developmental metrics between 
EITI and non-EITI countries.  In the second category researchers 
analyzed whether differentiation occurred within the same country 
prior to and after EITI implementation.221  The study utilized 
comprehensive, peer-reviewed data from the World Bank.  This data 
was sourced from more than 30 other sources permitting 
meaningful comparisons.  This study found no statistically 
significant differences across any of the eight developmental metrics 
for either research category.222  Despite recognized limitations of the 
study,223 the research concluded that the “EITI has an insubstantial 
role at affecting key governance indicators.”224  Acting in the absence 
of the institutional weight of governmental support, the EITI is 
unable to ensure good governance and proper accountability.225 
This analysis suggests that the EITI is not as successful as its 
advocates want us to perceive it to be. 226  However, despite these 
general conclusions and although not statistically significant, the 
analysis does indicate possible positive effects of the EITI initiative on 
the metric of regulatory quality.227  Regulatory quality during 
candidacy was found to be significantly greater than zero and higher 
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than the non-EITI country comparison group in the phase directly 
prior to EITI implementation.228 
While it was expected that the EITI would prove a better 
governance tool than CSR measures, it has not seemed to do so.229  
In my opinion, however, effectiveness is only one tool by which to 
gauge a collective governance mechanism, and while valid, it is 
arguably a short-sighted metric.  Its use here is equivalent to 
announcing a marathon victor after determining who was in the 
lead at the first yard.  There is simply still too much race left to run.  
The development of the EITI is a process.  All effective processes 
take time and iterations to develop into a working form, and all 
global processes take even more time.  Further, the EITI demonstrates 
that global governance mechanisms are an iterative process, one oft-
refined through trial and error.  The EITI therefore should neither be 
lauded for its effectiveness nor condemned (yet) for its lack thereof.  
Rather, it should be recognized that the EITI played an important 
role in catalyzing the development of consensus around the need for 
transparency norms on payments to governments.230  At this time, it 
is immaterial that these transparency norms have not positively 
impacted governance.  The EITI continues to play a useful role in 
clarifying problems within the industry and identifying potential 
remedies while building necessary support for reform.231  This is due 
to the unique position the EITI has been able to carve for itself within 
the global governance arena.  It has successfully departed from both 
the hierarchical, external oversight mechanisms, as well as the 
purely voluntary self-monitoring models encompassed throughout 
CSR initiatives.  Its success in this departure can be attributed to 
insisting upon multi-stakeholder participation.  This ensures that 
stakeholder voice is heard, heeded, and incorporated throughout 
the design and implementation of the EITI. 
Bringing the diverse, complex, and often conflicting set of 
stakeholders—including multinational and state-owned companies, 
host and home governments, industry groups, international 
financial institutions, investors, and civil society groups—within the 
industry together around the table is an accomplishment in itself.  
As a multi-stakeholder initiative, the EITI is able to emphasize its 
message—encouraging the prudent use of natural resource wealth 
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in the interest of national development—across a wide range of 
actors.  This multi-stakeholder approach is one of the unique 
features of the EITI.  The expectation is that opening the books 
would build trust between different stakeholders of the extractives 
sector, and also promote accountability between governments and 
corporations on one hand and society on the other, thereby 
advancing public interest.232  In the long-run, this collaborative 
rather than combative approach will likely make the EITI more 
useful as a global governance mechanism than other approaches.233  
Since its inception the EITI has demonstrated that such a multi-
stakeholder approach can go beyond the lowest common 
denominator standard and create a process of learning that has 
gradually raised the bar.  This has helped to create an expectation of 
transparency in the extractive sector which was previously 
notoriously opaque and murky.234  As such, transparency and 
stakeholder participation have become mutually reinforcing 
mechanisms within the EITI’s governance scheme.  But, 
transparency by itself cannot ensure the responsible use of resource 
revenues.235  In order to move resource governance toward holistic 
and sustainable development there must be a new addition to the 
collective governance model—the addition of collaborative 
accountability.236  
4. INCORPORATING COLLABORATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY INTO THE 
COLLECTIVE GOVERNANCE MODEL 
Despite the traction that collective governance models like the 
EITI have gained in the global governance arena, they have yet to 
depart entirely from their Westphalian, command-and-control 
counterparts.  As such, collective governance models still retain 
certain attributes of those regimes.  One such attribute is the concept 
of linear liability.237  Without a departure from this toward a more 
collaborative accountability mechanism, attempts by the EITI to 
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engender sustainable development will likely be in vain.  It bears 
noting that I do not advocate an unconditional replacement for the 
existing accountability model.  Where corporations actually cause 
direct harm, they should be held to account under the linear liability 
model.  However, I am advocating the addition of a second prong 
to this existing accountability mechanism measured in degrees of 
positive change.  This means that we should investigate not only 
those instances where corporations actually cause harm, but also 
where either their failure to act or their actions do not result in 
degrees of positive developmental change.238 
Collaborative accountability can be defined by several 
characteristics, all of which are recognizable within the EITI 
initiative even though some still require significant development.  
The first characteristic is based on the assumption that most of the 
pressing global problems must be solved collectively, requiring 
proactive, multi-sector—government, industry, and civil society—
participation.  Second, collaborative accountability requires a larger 
emphasis on omission from taking positive action rather than the 
commission of harmful action as the cornerstone of corporate 
responsibility.239  This shifting emphasis on omission implies that 
corporate responsibility reaches beyond negative obligations to do 
no harm and includes positive obligations.240  Lastly, these positive 
obligations must be framed as political responsibility.241  Political 
responsibility means actual engagement in and facilitation of the 
political process and corresponding discourse.  Political 
responsibility may be best understood as a communicative 
responsibility.242  Otherwise stated, it is a responsibility to engage in 
a public discourse with others for the sake of organizing our 
relationships and coordinating action most justly.243 
This chapter will explore these concepts further by identifying 
how linear liability fails to serve as an effective accountability 
mechanism within the context of structural harm.  This is followed 
by a discourse illuminating why collective governance models must 
assign more accountability to corporations in order to support 
 
 238 Id. at 181. 
 239 Id. at 158. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Id. at 182. 
 242 Id. at 172–73. 
 243 Id. at 173. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
878 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 40:4 
sustainable development goals.  The final section focuses specifically 
on how the EITI currently operates to achieve this. 
4.1. The Blurred Lines of Liability 
As demonstrated, the world is turning toward more 
collaborative and participatory forms of governance,244 but within 
this system exists fragmented and overlapping authority.245  The 
individualism of this model, built upon concepts of linear liability, 
counter-intuitively limits, rather than expands, the accountability 
for collectively produced harms, allowing institutional actors such 
as transnational corporations to both intentionally and 
inadvertently avoid responsibility.246  When viewed through the 
lens of linear liability, this fragmentation of authority creates an 
accountability gap because the nature of structural harm is not 
linear.247  The type of structural harm posed by the resource curse is 
too nuanced to fit within the current linear conception of liability.  
Therefore, collaboration, not only surrounding the decision-making 
process—as demonstrated by multi-stakeholder involvement in the 
development of EITI’s reporting standards—but also within 
accountability mechanisms, will be a necessary condition for 
improved regulatory quality in an increasingly interconnected 
world.248 
There are two aspects to regulatory quality: the decision-making 
process surrounding the creation and implementation of regulation, 
as well as the accountability mechanism of that regulation.  As the 
previous chapter demonstrates, much attention has been paid to 
building the framework surrounding decision-making within the 
EITI; the accountability mechanisms have seen little of this due.  
Instead, collective governance mechanisms such as the EITI have 
incorporated within their accountability frameworks the existing 
accountability model based on the concept of linear liability.249  
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Linear liability is based on the conception that human relations 
consist of small-scale interactions, with clearly demarcated lines of 
causation among independent actors.250  Therefore, under a linear 
liability model, one would hold those who are causally responsible 
for bringing about a problem responsible for rectifying it.251  It is 
further assumed in this linear liability model that such responsibility 
can be allocated fully between all responsible parties.252  In practice, 
however, these precise lines of causation are increasingly obscured 
under today’s societal, structural conditions,253 leaving our current 
understanding of responsibility inadequate for regulating global 
social problems.254 
In today’s globalized world, private actors, such as extractive 
companies, share enlarged public and political authority, often 
operating in roles that were traditionally understood to be those of 
the public sphere.255  As such, authority is no longer associated 
exclusively with the public sphere, and the line between what is 
public and what is private also blurs.256  This line continues to blur 
as private enterprises increasingly engage in the decision-making 
processes surrounding regulation.257  Despite this increased 
authority, increased accountability—the flip side of the coin—has 
not followed suit. 258 
Linear liability assigns blame in order to compensate for past 
wrongdoings.  This backward-looking approach is distinct from the 
forward-looking nature of collaborative accountability, which 
acknowledges the impossibility of tracing individual shares of 
responsibility in the case of structural problems.  Instead, it is 
directed at the transformation of harmful structures by assigning 
responsibility for creating positive change to actors even when they 
are not to blame for past harm.  “The point is not to blame, punish, 
or seek redress from those who did it, but rather to enjoin those who 
participate by their actions in the process of collective action to 
 
 250 See SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, BOUNDARIES AND ALLEGIANCES: PROBLEMS OF JUSTICE 
AND RESPONSIBILITY IN LIBERAL THOUGHT 39 (2001) (arguing about individual 
responsibility in a Global Age); Wettstein, supra note 6, at 157. 
 251 Wettstein, supra note 6, at 157. 
 252 Id. at 158. 
 253 Id. at 162. 
 254 Id. at 157. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. at 162. 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id. at 161. 
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change it.”259  This responsibility is a shared responsibility and can 
only be discharged through collective action: “[t]he structural 
processes can be altered only if many actors in their diverse and 
unique social positions work together to intervene in these processes 
to produce different outcomes.”260  This requirement and necessity 
of collaboration is embedded in the model, which essentially 
requires it to be a positive responsibility or, in other words, actual 
concrete actions.261 
The reality of today’s globalized world presents a mismatch 
between the individualism of this linear liability model and the 
imperative for collaborative responses to global problems in the 
collective age.262  The current conception of accountability as 
individual increasingly clashes with the collective nature of 
structural harm.263  Moving beyond negative obligations to positive 
obligations is not a clear process under the circumstances of large-
scale structural problems for two reasons.  First, under such 
circumstances, the full extent of actions is rarely fully 
comprehended.  Often it is unforeseeable in the sense that a person 
or organization could contribute to harm without even engaging in 
any overtly harmful action.264  Under such circumstances, the no 
harm principle loses normative strength and thus the potential to 
provide guidance for how to behave. 265  Second, if it is 
indeterminable to what extent and in what manner actors contribute 
to a persisting large-scale problem, both blame and its remedial 
responsibility cannot be proportionately allocated.  As a result, the 
structural problem remains systematically unaddressed, or at least 
under-addressed.  Structural harm is notoriously ambiguous.  
Understanding what actions by what actors contributed to the harm 
lacks clarity.  This complexity combined with the sheer number of 
actors breaks the chain of causation.  Therefore, in situations of 
structural harm, there is a breakdown in the logic of the linear 
liability model.  It is virtually impossible to pinpoint the exact source 
of the harm, and therefore impossible to mitigate it.  In actuality, the 
linear system may prevent, rather than facilitate, viable solutions for 
 
 259 Young, supra note 26, at 122. 
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the most pressing of today’s prevailing global problems.266  
Corporate responsibility needs to be reframed to take this into 
account.  It should be a conception of collaborative accountability 
taking into account the multiplicity of today’s actors and the various 
interdependencies between them.267 
This restrictive nature of the existing liability model in practice 
leaves the most pressing and challenging problems we face as a 
global society in the domain of supererogatory action.268  This is an 
inadequate ethic for the collective age.269  An adequate ethic “must 
be able to provide guidance for ascribing responsibility beyond the 
principle to do no harm.”270  It calls for a fundamental change in how 
we conceptualize what is and is not appropriate corporate conduct 
and how we allocate responsibility for misconduct.271  Such an 
allocation of responsibility would suggest that while we all have a 
responsibility to make a difference, it is those with the greatest 
power to have a potential positive impact on the situation who bear 
the largest share of accountability.  “While everyone in the system 
of structural and institutional relations stands in circumstances of 
justice that give obligations with respect to all the others, those 
institutionally and materially situated to be able to do more to affect 
conditions of vulnerability have greater obligations.”272 
4.2. The Responsibility of Corporations through the Lens of 
Collaborative Accountability 
One way of enhancing collaborative accountability mechanisms 
is by assigning greater responsibility to institutional agents, such as 
corporations.  Corporations are better equipped to deal with the 
structural conditions of today’s large-scale global problems.  
Institutions are better at collecting and processing information than 
individuals and more able to bear the costs of regulating large 
problems.273  These attributes makes them better able to assess and 
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understand indirect effects of their decisions, which place them in 
the best position to avoid harmful outcomes linked to their conduct.  
Thus, corporate actors have greater leverage and impact in terms of 
producing harm, as well as, preventing and remedying it.274  This 
shift to collaborative accountability is of large relevance to 
corporations not only because they are institutional agents, but also 
because they most certainly are among those institutions which have 
dramatically increased their authority at the global level.  Thus, 
corporate responsibility in the collective age must increasingly be 
interpreted within this larger conception of collaborative 
accountability.  This means that corporations must increasingly 
collaborate with other private and public institutions in order to 
promote positive change in regard to the pressing global problems 
we currently face. This claim is not merely ethical, but also 
political.275 
Corporations should engage in this process and greater 
responsibility should be placed with these institutional agents for 
several reasons.276  Further, companies have powerful built-in 
platforms to advocate for action.  When they join together their 
voices are much more effective at creating real change.277  
Companies possess access and influence that are central to 
sustainable development.  They play an active role in translating 
political programs into action.  As such, industry should be at the 
forefront of fostering development.278  Additionally, the reputation 
of a corporation is one of its most important financial assets.279  Since 
corporations exist in the broader social world, they depend on forms 
of public governance to sustain them and the conditions under 
which they operate.280  The perception of corporations as 
instruments for the maximization of private interests is a relatively 
young one, and it denotes a distortion of what these institutions 
were originally designed to be.  Corporations were historically 
created as public institutions to address public needs.  Profits are an 
 
 274 Wettstein, supra note 6, at 160. 
 275 Id. at 162. 
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 277 Id. at 174. 
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instrument to fulfill the corporate purpose, rather than the actual 
purpose itself.281 
Despite this, corporate actors cannot solve pressing global 
problems acting alone.  Collaborative accountability is required.282  
Collaborative accountability shifts the primary responsibility for 
structural problems from individuals to institutions.283  Further, it 
detaches the responsibility to contribute to solutions from an actor’s 
prior involvement in causing the problem.284  In contrast to the 
liability model, a conception of collaborative accountability assigns 
responsibility to all actors, whether individual or institutional, 
whose contribution is deemed essential for a viable solution to 
prevailing global problems regardless of whether they were 
involved in causing the problem initially.285  Thus, in order to assign 
institutional responsibility for regulating global injustice, it is less 
important to show that an institution has actually caused poverty or 
a human rights abuse than it is to show how it is capable of taking 
remedial steps against them.286  This model places a larger emphasis 
on positive obligations.  A positive obligation is an obligation to 
change the status quo for the better, that is, to improve an 
unsatisfactory state of affairs or to assist others in doing so.287  Such 
a model is more suitable for the collective age in that it focuses on a 
corporation’s contribution to collective efforts aimed at global 
problem-solving.288  Therefore, corporate responsibility in the 
collective age entails positive obligations.  The present view is that 
such participation is beyond the call of duty.289 
According to the current conception of responsibility, 
corporations would not have an obligation to participate in such 
discourse unless they were instrumental in causing the relevant 
harm.  Collaborative accountability suggests otherwise.290  Under a 
collaborative accountability model, if the urgency of the situation is 
clear to a reasonable person and it seems similarly clear what kind 
of action is needed to rectify harm then a positive obligation exists 
 
 281 Wettstein, supra note 6, at 171. 
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to act to improve the situation.  Further, when the action and 
expected outcome are so clearly favorable, a random collection of 
individuals may be held responsible for failure to take collective 
action.291  “This presupposes that we have an idea about what 
constitutes an improvement to a given situation and thus about 
what it is that we are striving for in a society.”292  This could be 
contentious in regard to global responsibilities as it seems difficult 
enough to design a common idea of “good” within the boundary of 
a particular culture.293  Therefore, determining with precision what 
acts by what actors will make a positive impact is always a daunting 
task and may even prove impossible.294  However, in regard to 
issues such as global poverty, environmental degradation, climate 
change, and sustainable development it is obvious to the reasonable 
person that action rather than inaction by the collection is called for 
even if the specific required action(s) is not self-evident.295  Despite 
this lack of clarity, corporations should not escape accountability.  
Rather, they should hold a collective responsibility to participate in 
the political conversation about how to best rectify harm.  Thus, 
under a model of collaborative accountability, all those institutions 
with essential and unique capabilities to contribute to potential 
solutions for the pressing global problems are accountable for 
actively engaging in political discourse on the matter.296  The power 
to influence these political processes and outcomes is an important 
factor in determining an institution’s degree of responsibility under 
a collaborative accountability framework.297 
This suggests that corporations should be held accountable not 
only for causing harm, but also for failing to engender positive 
change in the communities in which they operate.  At a minimum, 
corporations should be charged with participating in those multi-
actor policy dialogues that are essential for decision-making 
surrounding collective courses of action.  Such engagement then is 
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 292 Id. at 176. 
 293 Id. 
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 295 See Virginia Held, Can a Random Collection of Individuals Be Morally 
Responsible?, 67 J. PHIL. 471, 479 (1970) (arguing a collective group may be morally 
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no longer a voluntary CSR initiative as it is commonly perceived.  It 
no longer belongs to the realm of supererogation, but can be 
demanded of corporations.  The more vital the role of multinational 
corporations in solving large-scale global problems, the more their 
participation in such collaborative approaches becomes a matter of 
obligation.298  “Corporations that point to a lack of appropriate 
platforms that would provide an opportunity for them to participate 
in such efforts need to rethink their excuses,”299 especially as 
organizations like the EITI continue to grow, develop, and garner 
international credibility and become increasingly capable at 
providing such a platform.  Further, we should consider that 
corporations ought to be held accountable where they fail to 
participate in the already existing collective governance platforms, 
and that they should be charged with participating in building these 
platforms where they do not yet exist.  “In other words, the 
responsibility of corporations may well go beyond merely 
participating in such collective attempts; in some situations, they 
may have a responsibility to step up and take the initiative in 
organizing collective efforts to address certain issues.”300 
Business can no longer make do with merely not causing harm 
in the pursuit of the goals that they freely choose.301  Rather, the very 
purpose of businesses and corporations must be informed and 
ultimately legitimized by their potential contribution to the solution 
of prevailing social problems.302  A growing number of business 
ethicists argue for proactive corporate involvement in addressing 
global problems, including the promotion of just institutions, rule of 
law, and regulatory quality, as well as a duty to assist poor countries 
in their development.303 
 
 298 See id. at 166 (describing the need for a shift in responsibility from public to 
private spheres). 
 299 Held, supra note 295, at 480. 
 300 See Wettstein, supra note 6, at 166 (describing the need for a shift in 
responsibility from public to private spheres). 
 301 See Andreas Georg Scherer & Guido Palazzo, Toward a Political Conception 
of Corporate Responsibility: Business and Society Seen from a Habermasian Perspective, 32 
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 1096, 1110 (2007) (describing the changing conditions of 
corporate responsibility and their expanding domains). 
 302 See Wettstein, supra note 6, at 171 (arguing for proactive company 
engagement in addressing global problems). 
 303 Scherer & Palazzo, supra note 301, at 1110.  See also Wettstein, supra note 6, 
at 170–71 (explaining that businesses must go beyond not causing harm in their 
pursuits, but instead be informed and legitimized by their contribution to social 
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4.3. Characteristics of Collaborative Accountability within the EITI 
The signs of collaborative accountability—collective 
mechanisms, positive obligations, and political responsibility—are 
already taking shape within the EITI in a number of ways.  For 
example, the EITI is a fundamentally collective organization.  This is 
concretely demonstrated by the EITI’s requirement of “effective 
multi-stakeholder oversight.”304  This multi-stakeholder group must 
collectively agree to a work plan with clear objectives for EITI 
implementation.305  The remaining characteristics—positive 
obligations which are framed herein as political responsibility 306—and 
how these impact corporate responsibility requires a slightly more 
nuanced discussion as laid out below. 
The EITI sets forth requirements across eight broad categories.  
Each category further delineates mores specific clear-cut guidelines 
for compliance of these requirements, which arguably represent 
positive obligations of its implementing countries and associated 
corporate partners.307  These requirement categories are: (1) 
oversight by the multi-stakeholder group; (2) legal framework, 
including allocation of contracts and licenses; (3) exploration and 
production; (4) revenue collection; (5) revenue allocations; (6) social 
and economic spending; (7) outcomes and impact; and (8) 
compliance.308  While much of the onus is on the obligations of 
governments, notions of corporate responsibility are less overtly 
strewn throughout.  Corporations are bequeathed positive 
obligations throughout the requirements in two ways: directly and 
vis-à-vis the multi-stakeholder group.309  Positive obligations within 
the EITI are most frequently in the form of disclosure requirements.  
The purpose of these disclosure requirements is to enable 
understanding and inform public debate about the governance of 
the extractive industries and how resource revenues can be used 
effectively.  The EITI requires disclosure of information related to 
 
 304 EITI STANDARD, supra note 178. 
 305 Id. 
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operational licenses and contracts,310 production data,311 taxes,312 
revenue allocations,313 social expenditures,314 as well as impact of the 
extractive sector on the economy.315  As of 2020, the EITI will also 
require disclosure information regarding beneficial ownership.316  
This demonstrates that within the EITI there is a clear trend of 
continuing to enhance disclosure requirements and that the EITI as 
an organization recognizes that addressing structural harm is an 
iterative process. 
These obligations are political to the extent that they require 
discourse and decision-making surrounding definitional concepts.  
For example, not all contracts must be disclosed; there is discretion 
allowed within the disclosure requirements in that only those 
contracts deemed material must be publicly disclosed.  This 
discretion is afforded to the multi-stakeholder group which is 
charged with determining this materiality.  In this way, the 
companies who are members of the multi-stakeholder group have 
positive obligations to contribute to this type of political discourse 
on the subject matter.  Companies, even those that are not members 
of the multi-stakeholder group, are also directly charged with being 
“fully, actively, and effectively engaged in the EITI process.”317  The 
multi-stakeholder group is required to commit to work with these 
companies and should undertake effective outreach activities 
communicating their central role in EITI implementation.318  
According to Florian Wettstein: 
[This] account of political responsibility provides exactly the 
conceptual and theoretical frame for the kind of collaborative 
corporate accountability outlined earlier, that is, the 
responsibility to participate in and in some instances to 
actively organize the communicative platforms that allow a 
variety of different actors to deliberate and decide on the 
 
 310 See id. at 17–21(referencing Requirement 2). 
 311 See id. at 22 (referencing Requirement 3). 
 312 See id. at 22–6 (referencing Requirement 4). 
 313 See id. at 26–7 (referencing Requirement 5). 
 314 See id. at 28–9 (referencing Requirement 6). 
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collective courses of action needed to respond to specific 
problems.319 
As demonstrated, the EITI attempts to do precisely this. 
The reality on the ground, however, is that some companies are 
not cooperating with the EITI’s vision.  There is anxiety that as the 
EITI becomes more entrenched in reforming the sector’s policies, the 
companies that currently contribute to the annual disclosures 
process will cease to do so.320  “[O]ur fear now is that as we proceed 
deeper and deeper into reforming the sector, there is the likelihood 
that some of the companies would bow out of the EITI because some 
of the reforms” are no longer in their favor.321  While membership 
within the EITI itself is voluntary, countries are able to prevent 
companies from shirking those corporate responsibilities 
enumerated within the EITI by legislating the EITI framework 
making disclosure mandatory.322 
Arguably, such national implementation makes the EITI 
redundant.  But practically speaking that is not the case.  Political 
tides at the national level can swiftly change, such as when leaders 
transition.  One example of this is the recent repeal of the domestic 
implementing legislation of the EITI in the United States.323  
 
 319 Wettstein, supra note 6, at 173. 
 320 See Andrews, supra note 7, at 72 (describing the limited efficacy of EITI in 
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International institutions such as the EITI help create a type of 
immunity against ill changes of the political tide.  They serve as 
important mechanisms to establish norms and ensure continuity.  
But further, the EITI does more than just publish numbers.  It 
simultaneously involves people in the decision-making processes.  
Although the EITI provides an international standard, it is 
implemented at the national level.  “The role of the international 
management is to support and encourage [the EITI’s] meaningful 
implementation.”324  This dual framework of national 
implementation combined with international validation will be the 
linchpin of the EITI’s success as a governance mechanism.  When 
countries implement the EITI it is the people of those countries— 
through their respective democratic processes—who drive the 
initiative.  The EITI is simply a platform for dialogue about the 
management of their country’s natural resources.  The goal is to pry 
decisions regarding natural resource management and the 
associated revenue out of the private hands of corporate interests 
and thrust the conversation onto the public stage.  This means that 
the decisions regarding how to adapt the EITI implementation 
process to best reflect local circumstances, needs, and preferences 
are removed from the international body and placed squarely with 
those better able to contextualize, localize, and facilitate the political 
dialogue: those on the ground at the national level.325 
5. CONCLUSION 
It may be premature to deem the EITI a success story as an 
effective collective governance mechanism, but it is not premature 
to laud its accomplishments.  The EITI has a flexible, open 
organizational mindset that recognizes the complexity of the 
problems it seeks to address.  This adaptability alone puts it on the 
path toward success.  However, it must be recognized that there is 
still significant work to be done in further establishing corporate 
 
 324 EITI INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, HOW WE WORK (2016), 
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disclosure requirements.  Transparency has not yet become habitual 
corporate behavior, and it still lacks a level of conformity across the 
extractive industry.326  However, this is often the case with 
international norms.327  What can be said is that transparency in the 
extractive industries—a traditionally opaque sector—is no longer 
exceptional.  The EITI has played a leading role in mobilizing 
governments, industry, and civil society in advancing transparency 
through corporate disclosure.328  In this way, the EITI embeds 
corporations within the problem-solving processes of global 
governance.329 
The linear liability model no longer provides a satisfactory 
approach to counteract harm under current globalized conditions 
where injustices are often the result of actions from numerous actors 
and an array of organizational policies.330  It can be the case that 
those with the greatest power in the system are far removed from 
any interaction with those who are most harmed by it.331  A move 
toward collaborative accountability is critical in order to adequately 
address large-scale structural problems because it is not possible to 
trace with specificity the actor who caused the harm.332  It can be 
unfortunately tempting to insist on strengthening existing 
institutional regimes rather undergoing the onerous process of 
inventing new frameworks.  However, it is worth considering that 
while certain models, like linear liability, may have served us well 
historically, they cease to do so today. 
Instead it may be time to employ more organic alternatives—
ones which problem-solve and promote positive change through 
spontaneous evolution by recognizing when there is the capacity 
and ability to make changes and iteratively, intentionally, and 
repeatedly remove obstacles to progress.  Admittedly, these 
models—like the EITI—are less definitive, but might prove more 
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productive in a globalized world.  Ideally, such a model is reflective 
of and reflexive to the needs, cultures, and viewpoints of the diverse 
set of stakeholders which it represents333 in order to mitigate the 
likelihood of ethnocentrism334 and avoid the tendency to give 
priority to only those most apparently detrimental consequences of 
our actions.335  This is critically important in the global sphere where 
normative standards are not yet broadly accepted and governance 
mechanisms are weak.  As a transnational institution focused on the 
obligations of corporations, the EITI provides the opportunity for 
learning, persuasion, and deliberation, all of which are critical to 
acceptance of the moral legitimacy and authoritativeness of the 
evolving norms, standards, and rules it seeks to establish.336 
Although I applaud the EITI’s dynamism, I recognize that its 
framework is not without limitations.337  The EITI is confronted with 
administrative difficulties in data collection,338 challenges to 
integrating EITI efforts with other CSR initiatives, conflicting 
stakeholder expectations and power relationships, and disinterest in 
reforms.339  Further, the EITI’s narrow definition of transparency is 
problematic.  It focuses on transparency in government revenue—
the financial flows between industry and national treasuries—but 
misses where the corruption is often far worse: in government 
spending.340  However, the EITI was never intended to be a stand-
alone initiative, but rather an entry point that would begin “a 
process of disclosure and accountability in one link of the value 
chain—revenue flows from corporations to the governments of 
resource-rich countries,” and a process that would encourage 
governance reforms in other parts of the extractive value chain.341  
Despite this narrow approach, there is evidence that the EITI has 
given communities a means to hold governments and industry 
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accountable for extractive revenues and to demand reinvestment of 
such funds in their communities.342 
The voluntary nature of the EITI is also the frequent subject of 
criticism.  Again, it was recognized from the outset that the EITI is 
not be sufficient on its own accord to drive the necessary reform.  
The EITI explicitly recognizes its role as complementary to, and not 
exclusive of, other standards, laws, and institutions that are 
necessary to ensure effective governance of natural resources.  The 
initiative was designed as a stepping-stone to further domestic 
governance reforms to address rent-seeking behavior and will be 
most successful where it is part of wider legal reforms.343 
Further, the lack of legally binding obligations does not mean 
that adherence is entirely voluntary: agreements may be enforced 
through a variety of non-hierarchical compliance mechanisms such 
as public opinion.344  Additionally, the EITI Requirements may affect 
the public regulatory process in a number of ways: global and 
regional trade agreements may explicitly recognize them; 
government regulations may refer to them for definition of terms; 
and government procurement rules may adopt them.  Further, 
through pressure consumers, financiers, insurers, and competitors 
may insist on observing the Standards’ prerequisites for companies 
wanting to do business in that market.345  There are numerous 
instances of non-binding commitments evolving over time into hard 
international law: the soft law of today can become the hard law of 
tomorrow.346  The International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) has evolved ahead of the EITI but is one such example of this 
phenomenon.  Increasingly, ISO sets industry standards in 
conjunction with or in addition to those set by domestic regulators.  
As such, the ISO provides one example of a sector-specific, non-
hierarchical regime that morphed, in part, into hierarchical 
compliance enforced through hard law as standards were 
incorporated within country’s regulatory frameworks.347  Similarly, 
the EITI could later develop into such an institution engaged in 
 
 342 Id. 
 343 Id. at 152. 
 344 See Kobrin, supra note 22, at 360 (providing an overview of the various 
factors that impact transnational corporate compliance outside of binding law). 
 345 Id. at 366. 
 346 Id. at 360. 
 347 Id. at 366. 
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monitoring violations, judging transgressions and enforcing 
compliance.348 
Institutional flexibility is important, because uncertainty 
regarding the future exists.  Models such as the EITI are helpful, but 
they are not perfect.  These frameworks, while not predictive, inform 
processes.  Processes take time and global processes take even 
longer.  While the work of the EITI and transparency in general has 
been brandished as ineffective, their current effectiveness is 
immaterial.  Rather, what is pertinent is the institutional flexibility 
that the EITI as an organization possesses: namely, its recognition 
that systemic problems such as the resource curse are complex and 
further compounded by today’s interconnectedness, its ability to 
assess, reassess, and evolve to the changing needs, and the 
understanding that this is an ongoing, iterative process.  When 
assessing organizations like the EITI it is imperative not to read too 
much into a static assessment of effectiveness, but to look deeper at 
the institutional and organizational structure and its methodology, 
processes, and problem-solving strategies.  Effectiveness in the 
empirical sense is largely immaterial.  Rather, we should assess the 
degrees of positive change that a sector-specific public-private 
partnership like the EITI and other global governance mechanisms 
have initiated within the realm of corporate governance.  In this 
instance, the extractive industry has moved out of the opaque and 
murky waters of confidentiality into the expectation of transparency 
when conducting transnational operations.  This is no small step, but 
a colossal feat.  And based on its track record the EITI has little 
intention of stopping there.  Due to its institutional flexibility the 
long-term potential of the EITI for effectively creating positive 
change within the extractive industry is robust. 
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